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l1N TH'E SUPREME COURT 
of the 
ST ATE OF UT AH 
.J Al\1J£S A. McINTOSH, rrrustee in 
Bankruptcy, Estate of BOUNTIFUL 
MA'l'ERIALS & CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, Inc., B-446-65, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED STA'l1ES OF AMERICA 
' Defendant and Respondent. 
APPJ£LLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
11078 
STATEMJ£Nrr OF THI£ NATURJ£ OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein Plaintiff, the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy for the Estate of Bountiful Materials and 
Construction Company, Inc., sought to invalidate the 
claimed lien of the Small Business Administration, an 
Agency of the United States Government, on property 
which had come into his possession, as trustee. The 
lien was claimed by virtue of an "after-acquired" clause 
in the chattel mortgagP. 
DISPOSITION IN '11HJ£ LOWER COURT 
The Court ruled that the after-acquired provisions 
of the Small Business Administration chattel mortgage 
wen~ su1wrior to the right1' of Plaintiff, and entered. 
jndgnwnt in favor of defendant. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Appellant asks that the judgment of 
the Lower Court be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is the Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Es-
tate of Bountiful Materials and Construction Company, 
Inc., B-446-G5, wherein the voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy was filed in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah on April 21, 1965. 
After being appointed rrrustee, Plaintiff claimed 
title to the following personal property: 
Hydraulic press, shop built 
Gabriel Gas Fire Boiler, Model M-5 
Century vVater Softener, Model 110 F APT 
Brunt>r ~Water Filter, l\fodd AClOAB 
Dayton Grinder, Model 12853 
Delta Drill Press, Motor No. 9000 
1959 International Truck, Model AC-180 
Krane Kar 
Paint Air Uompressor and accessories 
Office Desk 
1962 Chevrolet Truck, G cyl 2 ton Serial #2C653K-
141-014 
Wooden Office Building located at 4042 West 2100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Plaintiff has sold all of the property except the 
Boiler, Water Softener, Water Filter and Office Desk, 
for a total sum of $2,590.00. Of that amount $1,500.00 
was received for the 1962 Uhevrolet truck. 
On May 20, 19G3, Bountiful Materials and Construc-
tion Company [nc. executed in favor of the Small 
Business Administration a Chattel Mortgage and After 
Acquired Property Agreement. The chattel mortgage 
contained the following provisions: 
'rhat Mortgagor hereby mortgages ... and any 
and all personal property, of like kind and char-
acter, hereafter acquired by Mortgagor and used 
or placed in or upon the above-described prem-
ises and elsewhere. 
Any additional property of like nature to the 
property herein mortgaged, hereafter acquired 
by Mortgagor, shall forthwith and without fur-
ther act, be and become subject to the lien of 
this mortgage. 
The After Acquired Property Agreement, a copy 
of which is part of the record before this Court, merely 
reaffirms the agreement that after-acquired property 
should be subject to the lien. 
A copy of the chattel mortgage was filed with the 
Nalt Lake County Recorder on May 27, 1963. 
The personal property described above was acquired 
bv Bountiful Materials and Construction Company, Inc. 
after the execution of the chattel mortgage and After 
Acquired Property Agreement. 
On April 5, 1965, Bountiful Materials and Construc-
tion Company, Inc. executed, in favor of the Small 
Business Administration, a chattel mortgage, specifi-
cally describing the property in question. A copy of this 
chattel mortgagt> was filed with the Salt Lake County 
Hecorder on April 5, l!:Jo5, and a copy filed with the 
4 
Utah State Tax Commission on April 23, 1965. No ad-
ditional mone>' was given by the Small Business Ad-
ministration for the April 5, 1965 chattel mortgage, 
however it agreed to forbear foreclosing its 1963 mort-
gage. 
On April 21, 1965, the date of the filing of the 
petition in Bankruptcy, Bountiful Materials and Con-
struction Company, Inc. had possession of the personal 
property in question, the same being located at 4042 
West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The obligation due to the Small Business Adminis-
tration exceeds the value of the personal property in 
question. 
Plaintiff claims that he is the owner of the personal 
property in question free and clear of any lien of the 
Small Business Administration, for the following rea-
sons: 
A. rrhe execution and lwrfection of the chattel 
mortgage dated April 5, 1965, was a preference within 
the meaning of Section GO of the Bankruptcy Act, and 
therefore invabd as it affrcts Plaintiff Trustee. 
B. The provision::; of the chattel mortgage dated 
May 20, 1963, which provide for a lien on after-acquired 
property, and the After Acquired Property Agreement 
dated May 20, 1963, are both invalid, and are not en-
forceablP agreements again::;t Plaintiff Trustee in the 
State of Utah. 
5 
C. 1f tlH• after-at(1uir<'d property provisions of the 
chattPJ rnortgag<' and tl11:· After Acquired Property 
Agret•rnt>nt are ,-alid, thP lien on the 1962 Chevrolet 
'rruck is still im-alid as it effects Plaintiff Trustee since 
' 
a cop:- of tlH· ehattd mortgage was not filed with the 
Utah 8tate Tax Commission until April 23, 1965, two 
days after the bankruptcy petition was filed. 
Defendant admits that the execution and perfecting 
of the chattel mortgage dated April 5, 1965, was a tech-
nical preference within the meaning of 8ection 60 of the 
Bankruptcy Act, and therefore invalid as it affects 
Plaintiff Trustee. 
However, defendant claims that the after-acquired 
property provisions of its agreements are valid in the 
8tate of Utah. Defendant also claims that Plaintiff 
Trustee is Pstopped to deny and vary the terms of the 
chattel mortgage and After Acquired Property Agree-
ment, and that Plaintiff has no greater or superior rights 
as '11rustee in Bankruptcy than the mortgagor pertain-
ing to the chattel mortgage and the After Acquired 
Property Agreement. 
The parties stipulated to the foregoing facts and 
the following issues of law: 
A. Are the after-acqnired property provisions m 
the chattel mortgage dated May 20, 1963, and the After 
Acquired Property Agreement dated May 20, 1963, valid 
in the t:-ltate of Utah, and do they create a lien on per-
sonal prop<:>rt)- superior to the interest of Plaintiff 
'11rustee "? 
6 
B. If the after-acquired property provisions are 
valid and do create a lien generally superior to the 
interest of the Plaintiff Trustee, is the lien on the 1962 
Chevrolet Truck void for failure to file a copy of the 
same with the Utah State Tax Commission prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition? 
C. Is plaintiff estopped to deny and vary the terms 
of the chattel mortgage dated May 20, 1963, and the 
After Acquired Property Agreement? 
The Lower Court ruled in favor of the Defendant 
on all issues of law. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN THE 
CHATTEL MORTGAGE DATED MAY 20, 1963 AND THE 
AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY AGREEMENT DATED MAY 
20, 1963 ARE VALID IN THE STATE OF UTAH AND CRE-
ATED A LIEN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY SUPERIOR TO 
THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE. 
Since April 21, 19G5, the date of the filing of the 
petition in bankruptcy by Bountiful Materials and Con-
struction Company, Inc., Section 70 of the Bankruptcy 
Act (11 U.S.C. section 110) has been amended to 
strengthen the position of the trustee, but on that date 
the second sentence of Section 70c read as follows: 
The Trustee, as to all property, whether or not 
coming into possession or control of the court, 
upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have 
obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings 
at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested 
as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and 
powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon 
7 
by such proceedings, whether or not such a credi-
tor actually exists. 
Therefore, the Plaintiff rrrnstee's rights to the chat-
tels are those which the laws of the State of Utah would 
allow to a supposed creditor of the bankrupt who had, 
at the date of bankruptcy, completed the legal or equit-
able processes for perfection of a lien upon all of the 
property available for the satisfaction of his claim 
against the bankrupt. Commercial Credit Company, Inc. 
vs. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1940). See 4A Collier 
on Bankruptcy, Section 70.79, et seq. Also, the determi-
nation of the validity of a chattel mortgage on after-
acquired property, as against a trustee in bankruptcy 
is dependent upon the law of the state where the prop-
erty is situated when acquired. Bussert vs. Quinlan, 267 
F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1959). See 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, 
:Section 70.82. 
The authorities throughout the United States are 
in conflict concerning the validity and effect of after-
acquired clauses. See 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, Section 
70.82; 15 Am Jitr 2d, Chattel Mortgages, Sections 24, 
25, 26, 53, 57, 67, 68, 70 and 71. The States seem to 
have reached five different conclusions. One group takes 
the view that a properly recorded chattel mortgage con-
taining an after-acquired clause will prevail over all 
subsequent parties, including purchasers, general credi-
tors and lien creditors. Another group takes the view 
that such a chattel mortgage will prevail over simple 
creditors and purchasers with notice, but not against 
thP legal lien of an attaching or execution creditor unless 
8 
the mortgage taket:> pot:>SPt:>t:>ion prior to such lien. An-
other group taket:> the view that such a chattel mortgage 
will not be valid until the mortgagee takes possession 
of the chattel. Some states permit such chattel mortgages 
by statute. ln some Htates after-acquired property 
clauses are of absolutely no effect. 
The reasoning behind decisionH upholding the valid-
ity of such clauses include: (a) Statutory authority, (b) 
the creation of an equitable lien under the maxim that 
equity considers that as done which ought to be done, 
and (c) the rnortgagt- is an executory contract, and the 
lien attaches when the property is acquired. 
Those States giving no effect to after-acquired prop-
erty clauses base their decisions on the common law 
rule that nothing can be mortgaged so as to affect the 
rights of suhst'quent purchasers and creditors which is 
not in existence at the date of the mortgage, or does 
not at the time actually belong to the mortgagor, or 
potentially belong to him incident to other property then 
in existence and belonging to him, 15 Am Jur 2d, Chattel 
Mortgages, Section 24. 
Counsel for Plaintiff has found no cases decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court ruling on the question of 
after-acquired clauses. 
Prior to January l, 19G6, the statutes of the State 
of Utah were silent on after-acquired clauses. On that 
date the Utah Uniform Commercial Code became effec-
tive. Section 70A-9-204 t:>pecifically authorizes a security 
interest in after-acquired property. 
While the Utah Statutes were specifically silent on 
the question of after-ac<-1uired clauses, some sections may 
shed a little light on tlw problem. Sl'ction 9-1-1 through 
!)-1-17 Utah Code Annotated (1953), although now re-
vealed, covered the law on the execution, filing for rec-
ord, and foreclosure of chattel mortgages, and must 
therefore be the law governing the chattel mortgage in 
the instant case. Section 9-1-1 covers the requisites for 
Yalidity of chattel mortgages, but does not discuss after-
acquired property. Section 9-1-5 through 9-1-12 covers 
foreclosure procedures. Section 9-1-8 covering the notice 
of foreclosure sales provides: 
1£very such notice shall specify: First, the date 
of the mortgage and where filed; second, the 
names of the mortgagor and mortgagee, and of 
the assignee of the mortgagee, if any; third, the 
amount claimed to be due thereon at the time of 
the first publication or posting of such notice; 
fourth, a description of the mortgaged property 
conforming substantially with that contained in 
the mortgage; fifth, the time and place of sale. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The wording emphasized certainly implies that the only 
property which can be foreclosed is that which is de-
scribed in the mortgage. A notice containing the words 
"any and all personal property, of like kind and char-
acter, hereafter acquired by Mortgagor, and used or 
placed in or upon the above described premises and 
Plsewhere" would not give the required notice to the 
mortgagor or to the publie of the property to be sold. 
This is an indication that the legislature intended that 
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the chattel mortgage be effective only against that prop-
erty specifically described therein. 
Of even greater importance is Section 68-3-1 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), which provides: 
The common law of 1£ngland so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States, or the Consti-
tution or laws of this state, and so far only as 
it is consistent with and adopted to the natural 
and physical conditions of this state and the 
necessities of the 1wople hereof, is hereby adopted, 
and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of 
this state. 
The common law rule which invalidates claimed liens 
on after-acquired property is not repugnant to, or in 
conflict with, the Constitution of the United States, the 
Constitution or laws of the State of Utah, nor is it 
inconsistent with the natural and physical conditions 
of the State of Utah or the people thereof. 
A case very similar on its facts and identical on 
its legal issues with the instant case is Phelps vs. Turner, 
351 S.W. 2d 176 (Ky. 1961). The case involved a chattel 
mortgage on after-acqnirc>d property, a subsequent bank-
ruptcy, and the enactment of the Uniform Commercial 
Code after the execution of the chattel mortgage, but 
before the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. 
In affirming the 'l'rial Court's holding that the after-
acq_uired clause was illegal, the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky said: 
The eourt rdied on l:Jrrndy l'allcy Grocery Corn-
pauy u. Patrick, :267 Ky. 768, 103 S.vV. 2d 307, 310, 
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wherein this Court in 1937 reluctantly and criti-
cally reaffirmed the common law doctrine that 
mortgages on after-acquired property such as a 
changing stock of goods were illegal because of 
the opportunity they afforded for cheating other 
creditors saying: 
''If third parties dealing with the mortgagor 
possess either actual or constructive notice of 
such prior bona fidP transaction, we fail to see 
wherein they should not be bound by the mortgage 
when with such knowledge they consent to the 
creation of their subsPqnent debts. But however 
that may be the stare decisis rule, so overwhelm-
ingly adopted and approyed by this and all courts, 
admonishes us that we should not depart there-
from, it involving a rule of property." 
We affirm the judgment on the basis of the 
Sandy Valley case, comforted by the knowledge 
that the Uniform Commercial Code ... , now ef-
fective in this jurisdiction, permits mortgages 
on after-acquired goods." 
The rule should be the same in the state of Utah. 
Prior to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, a chattel 
mortgage on after-ac4nired property was invalid as to 
third parties. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
LIEN ON THE 1962 CHEVROLET TRUCK WAS VALID IN 
VIEW OF THE FACT THAT A COPY OF THE CHATTEL 
MORTGAGE WAS NOT FILED WITH THE UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PE-
TITION IN BANKRUPTCY. 
A copy of tlw origial dmttel mortgage was not filed 
with the Utah StatP 'L1ax Commission. 
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Section 41-1-80, Utah Code Annotated (1953) pro-
vides: 
No conditional sale contract, conditional lease, 
chattel mortgage, or other lien or encumbrance or 
title retention instrument upon a registered ve-
hicle, other than a lien dependent upon posses-
sion, is valid as against the creditors of an owner 
acquiring a lien by levy or attachment or subse-
c1nent purchasc•1·s or encumhrancPrs without notice 
until the requirements of sections 41-1-81 to 41-
1-87 have been complied with. 
8ections 41-1-81 to 41-1-87 provide for the filing of 
copies of lien instruments with the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
The effect of 41-1-80 is not in doubt or cannot be 
questioned. As pointed out in argument under Point I, 
Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act puts Plaintiff in the 
class of persons against which an unfiled lien is invalid. 
Therefore, the claimed lien of the Small Business Ad-
ministration on the 19G2 Chevrolet Truck, not being filed 
with the Tax Commission, is invalid. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFF IS ESTOPPED TO DENY AND VARY THE TERMS 
OF THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE DATED MAY 20, 1963 AND 
THE AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY AGREEMENT. 
Defendant has set up an issue of estoppel, claiming 
that the Plaintiff is estopped to deny and vary the terms 
of the Chattel Mortgage dat<>d May 20, 1963, and the 
After Acquired Property Agrec•ment. Plaintiff is not in 
any way trying to vary and deny terms of the chattel 
13 
mortgage. Plaintiff's whole i)()sition is that those terms 
are invalid as they effect him. 
Plaintiff does not deny that his position as a hypo-
thetical creditor under Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act 
puts him in no better position than the hypothetical 
creditor who has taken some action that would set up 
an estoppel. However, the stipulated facts set forth no 
such action, and there is no factual or legal basis for 
an estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff and Appellant respectfully urges that the 
claimed lien of Defendant is invalid as it effects the 
Plaintiff, and asks the Court to reverse the Judgment 
of the Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN & PAULSEN 
John H. Allen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
920 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
